A dramshop is a bar. The name has evolved from the Middle Ages in England when drinks were sold by the dram which is one-eighth of an ounce.
Under the Liquor Code in Pennsylvania (and similar statutes in most states) it is illegal to serve a person who is visibly intoxicated; and if such a person is served, the owner of the bar where the person was served can be liable for the intoxicated person’s negligence if he or she should become involved in a mishap which is caused by the intoxication. The litigation resulting from such circumstances is referred to the “dramshop cases,” and among owners of restaurants and bars, there is constant fear of these actions. There is a two-year statute of limitations for these claims, and often the lawsuits are commenced at the end of the two-year period, long after anyone in the bar can remember what happened on that date.
A dramshop case (Tuski v. Ivyland Caf’, Ltd) which evolved from an unusual set of facts has resulted in a decision that was probably unexpected. Although the Ivyland Caf’ had a strict policy proscribing all employees from drinking alcohol on the premises, Michael Pettacio, the manager of the bar, had apparently ignored the rule for “many years” by his admission. On the day in question, he admitted himself to the bar when it was closed and became badly intoxicated. (A toxicologist estimated his blood alcohol level to be .25% at the time of the accident; at that level many people will pass out.)
He left the bar and struck a flagman, Joseph Tuski, on a highway construction project; tragically, Mr. Tuski is a quadriplegic for life as a result of the accident. Obviously, Mr. Pettacio was personally liable, but he had limited assets. The principal target of the lawsuit was the bar business and its dramshop insurance.
Although the owner of the bar had the strong policy against employees’ drinking on the premises, and although the bar was not open to the public when Mr. Pettacio did his drinking, the Superior Court held that the owner could be liable because he was aware of and tolerated the manager’s violation of the rule.
Perhaps the most surprising finding of the Court involved the requirement of the dramshop section of the Liquor Code which mandates that the bar can be liable only if it serves someone who is “visibly intoxicated.” How could that test be met since Mr. Pettacio was both the person serving and drinking? Deftly, the Court found that there was ample circumstantial evidence to infer that Mr. Pettacio must have been visibly intoxicated at the time he served himself.
One has to wonder if the fact that Mr. Tuski was so tragically injured influenced the Court to make its decision.
— Ken Butera